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How Will International Stocks Affect My Safe Withdrawal Rate? – SWR Series Part 67

November 18, 2026 – Welcome back to our Safe Withdrawal Rates Series! You can find the landing page with all SWR Posts here. Today’s post serves two purposes. First, I’d like to introduce a new feature in the Google Sheet I use to simulate retirement withdrawal strategies (see Part 28 for more info). I finally added an international stock market series going back to 1871. If you recall, I used non-US stock index data only starting in 1970, and filled in the S&P 500 index returns for the 1871-1969 period. With the new series, I can finally study how a more internationally diversified portfolio would have performed in the earlier historical period. So, what’s the effect of diversification with international stocks? Would it help raise the safe withdrawal rate in the early period? Should we invest in 100% stocks now, as recommended in the infamous Anarkulova, Cederburg, and O’Doherty paper “Beyond the Status Quo: A Critical Assessment of Lifecycle Investment Advice”? All interesting questions! Let’s take a look…

The new International Stock data: 16 markets, going back to 1871

So, what’s in the new series? A reader (who wanted to stay anonymous) reached out and offered to supply a back-filled international non-US stock index total return series. In the back of my mind, I had always planned to construct this non-US index myself. But it is a lot of messy work, so I always procrastinated. But I was happy when a reader offered me this series on a silver platter. I confirmed that the construction is exactly what I would have done if I had had the time, focus, and motivation to do it myself. Specifically, the new series is a market-cap-weighted index of 16 developed markets, in U.S. dollars, with gross dividends reinvested. For the World War II years, it’s blended toward GDP weights (more on that below). Here’s the international stock index replication procedure in more detail:

  1. Markets. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Nine are in from 1871; the rest join when their data start (Denmark in 1872, Norway in 1880, Japan in 1885, Finland in 1895, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland in 1900).
  2. Local returns. Annual total returns (price plus gross dividends) come from the Kuvshinov-Zimmermann long-run stock market dataset, with gaps filled from the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database.
  3. Currencies. We convert everything to U.S. dollars at year-end exchange rates. Where only annual averages exist, the year-end rates are estimated so that currency moves land in the right year: gold-standard cross rates before 1914, interwar year-end estimates, and December rates through the German hyperinflation. After 1945, we use published year-end rates, with official rates for Germany in 1948-49 and Japan in 1949-51.
  4. Weights. Each country’s dollar market cap at the prior year-end. Weights drift with prices, just like in the MSCI indexes. Before 1960, the UK usually made up 40-50% of the index.
  5. The World War II fix. Pure cap weights have a funny quirk in wartime: as the German, French, Japanese, and Italian markets collapse, their weights shrink too, so the war looks milder than it really was (-21% real for 1939-48, vs. -41% in the DMS data). So for 1939-48 and 1949-59 only, each year blends the cap-weighted return with a GDP-weighted one (blend weights 0.49 and 0.43). That hits the DMS figures of -41% and +345% exactly.
  6. Monthly returns. This step is really the crux of the series construction. Because most countries’ data series are annual, we can only generate an annual series that we then need to “monthify.” Each year’s return is spread over its 12 months in the shape of the UK market’s monthly dollar return (Bank of England share prices and the dollar-sterling rate), scaled so the months compound exactly to the annual number. This isn’t 100% ideal, but it’s the best we can do with the limited data available. This step designs the new series to have a 100% correlation with the UK intra-year, while maintaining the “correct” annual correlations. It’s not too much of a stretch either, considering that during much of the simulation period, the UK was the largest non-US stock index. It’s certainly close enough for a withdrawal rate analysis!
  7. The splice. From January 1970 on, the existing MSCI World ex USA returns are untouched. The index still starts at 100 in January 1871, so only the post-1970 level is rescaled.

Here’s what the new data look like next to the S&P 500:

S&P 500 total return net of CPI; non-US: the new series (MSCI World ex USA from 1970); December values.

International stocks went nowhere in real terms for 36 years, from the end of 1913 to the end of 1949. At monthly frequency, this drought period actually lasted from 5/31/1913 to 12/31/1950, or about 37.5 years. Ouch! Two world wars, a hyperinflation, several currency reforms, and a few outright confiscations will do that to you. The only slight diversification benefit from non-US stocks was that the drawdown 1929-1932 wasn’t as extreme as in the U.S.; about -32% abroad vs. -79% in the U.S.!

Actual results for investors back then may look even worse due to potential survivorship bias, i.e., the USSR and all eventual Warsaw Pact countries probably had a return of -100%, which we now know in hindsight, but an investor in 1913 didn’t know that yet and might have potentially invested in places like Russia, Romania, Poland, etc.

How good is the new International Stock data?

Before I put anything into the Google Sheet, I wanted to make sure this isn’t garbage in, garbage out. Let’s perform two checks:

1: Rerun the replication concurrently with the MSCI World ex-USA.

Same markets, same data sources, same weights and currency conversions, but applied to 1970-2016, where we have the actual MSCI World ex-USA data (gross dividends, nominal U.S. dollars). The test stops in 2016 because the Kuvshinov-Zimmermann data end there. Not bad at all:

PeriodCorrelation of annual returnsAnnualized Tracking ErrorReplicated Series CAGRMSCI World ex-USA CAGR
1970-20160.9912.85%9.24%9.31%
1970-19890.9883.53%15.77%16.08%
1990-20160.9932.26%4.65%4.55%

2: Compare with the DMS data before 1970.

Dimson, Marsh and Staunton publish real returns for a 22-country World ex-USA index over selected historical episodes (Credit Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2018, Table 1, p. 16). Two of those episodes (1939-48 and 1949-59) were used for the World War II fix, so they match by construction. The other three pre-1970 episodes were not used in the calibration:

DMS figures: Yearbook 2018 Table 1 (p. 16) and Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2006) Table 2 (p. 12); real US-dollar returns over calendar years, deflated by US CPI.

That’s honestly better than anyone could have expected. For perspective, even my own S&P 500 series (with its predecessor indexes and historical reconstruction) differs from the DMS USA index by up to 3.4 percentage points a year over 1929-31. Yet the two agree in the long run: 6.49% vs. 6.5% real per year over 1900-2017. The new international series compounds at 4.09% vs. 4.5% in DMS over the same window (Yearbook 2018, Figure 5, p. 11), a 0.4-point gap that sits in years outside the episodes above.

How to use the new International Stock data in the Google Sheet

The new series now lives in the “International Stocks” column of the Asset Returns tab, and the input is also relabeled “International Stocks”. If you’re working off an old copy of the sheet, make a fresh copy (File > Make a copy). As always, if you’re new to the toolbox, see Part 7 for the introduction and Part 28 for earlier updates. Then:

  1. Set your weights in the “Parameters & Main Results” tab: e.g., U.S. stocks in B8, 10-year Treasuries in B9, and non-US stocks in B12.
  2. Pick which international stock series you prefer pre-1970: Either “Non-US” (the new series) or “S&P 500” to use the old version.
  3. Set the horizon in B27 and the final value target in B28.
  4. Check the results on the same tab.
How to implement non-US stocks in the Google Sheet: allocate to this asset class, then decide which pre-1970 series to use: the new Non-US series or S&P 500.

So, in summary, if you don’t like the new international series and prefer to work under the previous assumption, i.e., pre-1969, a U.S. investor would have invested their entire equity allocation in the S&P 500 (and precursor indices), you can still do so. I like my Google Sheet to stay as backward-compatible as possible.

How do International Stocks affect Safe Withdrawal Rates?

As always, I like to simulate two retirement scenarios:

  1. The stereotypical Trinity/Bengen scenario of a 30-year retirement with asset depletion.
  2. The more FIRE-style scenario with a 50-year horizon and a final value target equal to 25% of the initial portfolio (of course, adjusted for CPI inflation)

In both cases, I start with my typical 75/25 baseline allocation, i.e., 75% U.S. large-cap stocks (VOO, IVV, SPY, or similar) and 25% U.S. intermediate Treasury Bonds (IEF, VGIT, or similar).

For the start dates from 1970 onward, I use only post-1970 data, so nothing changes there. Even the 1960s will have only mild differences in the withdrawal simulations. But we expect major differences in the earlier cohorts, i.e., around the Great Depression.

30-year horizon simulations

Let’s start with the fail-safe withdrawal rate as a function of the international share. I report results for both all historical cohorts and the Post-1926 period. Across all cohorts, international equities aren’t very useful. I simulate all historical cohorts, shifting the 75% equity weight from 75%/0% domestic/international to 30%/45% international in 7.5% steps. Intermediate bonds will stay at 25%.

The highest failsafe withdrawal rate rises from 3.82% to 3.91% if we allocate one-tenth of the equity share to international stocks (i.e., 67.5% domestic stocks, 7.5% international stocks, and 25% bonds). Not a huge difference. If we consider only the post-1926 era, we’d ideally allocate 22.5% to international (i.e., 52.5%/22.5%/25%), and we’d achieve a pretty impressive improvement in our safe withdrawal rate, i.e., 4.33% vs. 3.82%, or a roughly 13.3% boost in the retirement budget.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

Let’s shed some more light on the data and determine the cause of the underwhelming diversification performance when including all cohorts. In the chart below, I plot the failsafe across all cohorts again, along with the decade-specific failsafe rates for the relevant decades (1900s, 1910s, and 1960s). Interestingly, the 1960s would have massively benefited from more international diversification. However, once we add more international stocks, the 1900s become the worst-case scenario (between 7.5% and 22.5% international allocation), after which the 1910s become the worst-case cohort for international equity allocations of 30%+.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

If we ignore the 1900s and 1910s, diversification looks more promising. Here’s the same chart for the post-1926 era. I again plot the post-1926 failsafe and the relevant decades that cause those worst-case scenarios in the simulations, i.e., the 1920s, 1930s, and 1960s. Both the 1920s and 1960s would have benefited from a higher international equity share. But there is a limit! Raising the international equity allocation too much makes the 1930s the worst-case scenario, which was previously quite safe (i.e., well above 4%) but then gets worse quickly as the poor performance of international stocks during WW II takes over. The sweet spot appears to be 22.5% international stocks (and 52.5% domestic to reach 75% equities). If you rely on linear interpolation, you’d likely go to 25% international stocks and 50% domestic, where the red and green lines intersect, with a 4.35% withdrawal rate.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

Just for completeness, I also include a bar chart with all failsafes by decade. Notice that for the 1990s and 2000s, we don’t have a complete 30-year simulation window, so I “pad” the last few years with calibrated data (explained more in Part 1 of the series). Safe withdrawal rate simulations rely heavily on the first few years of returns (Sequence Risk!) and the second half of returns (whether real, historical, or average padded returns) usually has little impact on the safe withdrawal rate. Still, we take the withdrawal rates based on the calibrated return data with a grain of salt.

Safe Withdrawal Rates by decade as a function of the international stock allocation.

… and a table with the same results, plus the failure rates of a 4% Withdrawal Rate.

Safe Withdrawal Simulations: 30 years, asset depletion. 75% equities, 25% intermediate bonds.

50-year horizon simulations

Next, let’s check how international stocks improve your FIRE simulations, i.e., we require safety for 50 years, with an additional cushion of 25% of the initial portfolio (adjusted for CPI, of course) at the end. So, let’s go through the same set of charts and tables. I start with the overall failsafe withdrawal rates, both for all cohorts and the post-1926 era; see the chart below. If we include the 1900s and 1910s, no level of international stocks will enhance your retirement. Your failsafe starts at 3.23% and only gets worse as you add more international stocks. However, for the post-1926 era, there is a sweet spot again at 22.5% international stocks (thus 52.5% domestic, i.e., a 70/30 split within the equity portion), which affords you a 3.57% failsafe. Adding more international stocks will then lower the failsafe again.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

Let’s look again at what causes this shape of failsafe withdrawals. It turns out, the 1900s are the culprit and provide the constraining cohort for all levels of international stock exposure. I included the 1910s, 1920s, and 1960s just for reference. The 1910s had a similar shape to the 1900s, though just shifted up by a few basis points. In contrast, both the 1920s and 1960s would have significantly benefited from more international diversification.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

Next, let’s look at the post-1926 failsafes as a function of the international stock allocation. As before, maximizing the fail-safe withdrawal rate through international diversification faces a tradeoff between the 1920s (diversification helps) and the 1930s (diversification hurts), with a sweet spot at 22.5% international and 52.5% domestic equities. Also noteworthy, during the 2000s, one cohort (3/31/2000, right before the Dot-Com Bust) acts as a spoiler and generates an even slightly smaller SWR (3.57%) than the intersection of the red and blue lines for the 1920s and 1930s. Of course, the 2000s cohort relies on calibrated data post-2026, so we might not rely 100% on that one cohort’s failsafe withdrawal rate.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

Here’s a summary chart of all failsafe stats in the same format as above. Intriguingly, over the longer horizon, international stocks didn’t help any cohort in the 1980s, 1990s, or 2000s.

Safe Withdrawal Rates by decade as a function of the international stock allocation.

Finally, as before, a more detailed summary table. If we want to maximize the failsafe, we’d pick 7.5% (all cohorts) or 22.5% (post-1926). If we want to minimize the failure rate of the 3.5% or 4% Rule (a very different objective function, clearly), we might add a little bit more international exposure.

Safe Withdrawal Simulations: 50 years, 25% final value target. 75% equities, 25% intermediate bonds.

With International Stocks, Can We Use 100% Equities Now?

You may remember my post from two years ago, critiquing the paper “Beyond the Status Quo: A Critical Assessment of Lifecycle Investment Advice,” written by Aizhan Anarkulova, Scott Cederburg, and Michael S. O’Doherty. The paper recommends a 100% equity allocation split equally between domestic and international stocks as the simplest and best overall lifetime portfolio. I tend to agree that on your path to retirement, a 100% equity allocation is likely the way to go, probably enhanced slightly by an eventual glidepath into bonds as you get close to retirement (see Part 43 on the optimized pre-retirement glidepath logic). However, once you’re in retirement, a 100% equity portfolio seems too risky, specifically, too exposed to Sequence of Return Risk. But I want to keep an open mind: maybe adding international stocks could have helped hedge away sequence risk in retirement. So, let me simulate that scenario. This time, let’s look at 100% equity portfolios and shift the international share from 0% to 80% in 10% steps. Side note: I did the simulations also for 90% and 100% international stocks, but will display the results only for 0-80%, as there is no gain post-80%.

Let’s start with the 30-year horizon with asset depletion. I plot the blue and black lines again for the “All Cohorts” and “Post-1926 cohorts as a function of the international share (0% to 80% in 10% steps). My results confirm that the Cederberg paper is spot on: If you insist on a 100% equity allocation, you’re far better off with international diversification. A 100% U.S. equities portfolio would have had a gnarly 2.85% safe withdrawal rate (but obviously fantastic upside potential in the non-worst-case scenarios!). Replacing between 40% and 50% of your domestic allocation with non-US stocks would have raised your failsafe substantially to 3.71% for all cohorts and 3.86% for the post-1926 cohorts. So, I’m glad that I confirmed their results, albeit with a different methodology.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

But I still maintain my criticism: once you retire, you should revisit the 100% equity allocation that got you there and reoptimize. For example, across all cohorts, even the optimal all-equity portfolio (60%/40% domestic/international) has a worse failsafe (3.71%) than the best 75/25 allocation with international stocks (3.91%). Likewise, in the post-1926 era, the best 75/25 portfolio with international allocation handily beats the 50% domestic, 50% international stocks allocation: 4.33% vs. 3.86%.

I also include a detailed table with more results, in the same format as above:

Safe Withdrawal Simulations: 30 years, asset depletion, 100% equities.

I can do the same exercise for the FIRE scenarios, i.e., for the 50-year horizon with a 25% final value target. Now the peak performance of the 100% equity portfolio (measured as the failsafe withdrawal rate) occurs at 30% international stocks (all cohorts) and 40% international for the post-1926 cohorts. One difference we notice is that, for all cohorts, the best 75/25 portfolio with international stocks only matches the best 100% equity portfolio. In that case, you’d probably be better off going with 100% equities. However, for the post-1926 era, you’re significantly better off with the 52.5%/22.5%/25% optimized portfolio with only 75% equities.

Safe Withdrawal Rates as a function of the international stock allocation.

As before, here are the detailed results in a table:

Safe Withdrawal Simulations: 50 years, 25% final value target, 100% equities.

A Caveat!

How representative is this new international equity return series for today’s retirees? International stocks trailed U.S. stocks by between 2 and 3 percentage points; see the table below. Early on, at least, you had a very low correlation, i.e., only 0.30 in the simulated period from 1871 to 1969. But since then, economies and financial markets have become more connected. The correlation between the MSCI World ex-US has been 0.69 since its inception in 1970, and it’s even 0.86 since the turn of the millennium. Withdrawal-rate simulations with such a low early correlation may artificially increase the attractiveness of non-US stocks, when we likely won’t see such low correlations again anytime soon (notwithstanding some crazy theories that the U.S. will lose its position as the world’s economic and financial top dog). So, we must use caution when extrapolating the diversification potential of international stocks and not get too excited about past diversification performance when correlation was at a rock-bottom 0.30.

Total return stats, adjusted for CPI: US Stocks vs. non-US Stocks over different time periods.

This discussion reminds me of the small-cap, value, and small-cap value stock discussion: The Fama-French SMB (small over large cap) and HML (high book value over low book value) factors were historically vastly profitable, especially between 1926 and about the early 1980s; see Part 62 for more details. Today it appears that rational market participants have arbitraged away that previously fantastic profit opportunity. So, I always warn people not to put too much faith in historical simulations that rely on rosy small-cap value performance. Here it’s a similar flavor: international stocks have offered much less diversification recently than they had pre-1969.

Conclusion

The new international equity total return series (16 markets, cap-weighted, calibrated to DMS for the World War II years) matches MSCI closely when rerun on 1970-2016 (correlation 0.991). Before 1970, it stays within 1.2 percentage points a year of DMS in the episodes it wasn’t calibrated to.

Before this update, the toolbox’s non-US column was just the S&P 500 before 1970, so an international weight barely changed the worst historical cohorts. Was that a huge problem? Probably not because the typical U.S. investor would have found it challenging to allocate to non-US equities before 1970. Nevertheless, I like to leave the simulation design decision to you and give you the option to run your retirement simulations with “true” international data. Recall that my Google SWR Simulation Sheet results have (at least) two interpretations: 1) how would historical cohorts have fared had they retired between 1871 and 2015, and 2) the thought experiment of how my retirement today and in the future would look if the past return patterns were to repeat? So, even if you don’t believe retirees in 1926 would have easily invested 50% of their portfolio in non-US stocks, we can still use that second approach.

Of course, the sheet is backward compatible, so if you prefer the old convention (U.S. index data for 1871-1969), you can switch back to that as well.

My simulation results indicate that a slight international allocation would have improved your retirement experience, at least for the post-1926 cohorts. The 1900s and 1910s were more of a mixed bag. For a 30-year retirement, we still improved the results somewhat. However, the 36-year drought in non-US stock returns between 1913 and 1949 would have wreaked havoc on some historical retirement cohorts in 1901, 1907, and 1911 if they had invested even a small percentage in non-US stocks. Also noteworthy: international stocks now have a far higher correlation with the U.S. than in the historical simulations before 1970. I wouldn’t blame anyone for keeping a mostly domestic equity allocation.

Please leave your comments and suggestions below! Additionally, be sure to explore the other parts of the series; see here for a guide to the different parts so far!

Title Picture Credit: WordPress AI + ERN edits

Data Sources for the new International Stocks series:

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